Stateful Online Monitoring Catches Distributed Agent Attacks
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| Authors | Davis Brown et al. |
| Year | 2026 |
| Field | AI / ML |
| arXiv | 2605.31593 |
| Download | |
| Categories | cs.CR, cs.AI |
Abstract
Language models can find thousands of severe software vulnerabilities, and agents are increasingly being misused for cyberattacks. To avoid detection, attackers frequently distribute their misuse, splitting a harmful task across many user accounts so each individual transcript looks benign. Because safety monitors score only one agent context at a time, they are structurally blind to misuse that is only visible in aggregate, across many accounts. We show this gap is real by building, to our knowledge, the first distributed agent attack, a multi-agent scaffold that completes hard cybersecurity tasks while hiding the harmful objective across subagents with limited contexts, evading a standard monitor that catches it only a fifth as often as prior agent attacks. Towards a defense, we develop an online stateful monitor that uses real-time clustering to collect weak suspiciousness signals across many agent transcripts, and escalates only rarely to a language model that flags misuse across user accounts. In evaluations with large-scale simulated datacenter traffic, our monitor Pareto dominates standard monitors, catching distributed attacks 30% earlier and flagging cyber misuse before it reaches the most harmful stages. Crucially, this comes at negligible additional latency for ~99% of user traffic. This detection advantage persists but narrows as the benign background traffic grows very large. After an extensive red-teaming exercise, we improve the defense and surprisingly also find that it catches standard jailbreaks, since adaptive attackers reuse attack variants across accounts. Our results point toward a new class of safety monitors which reason over groups of users rather than isolated transcripts.
Engineering Breakdown
The Problem
This detection advantage persists but narrows as the benign background traffic grows very large.
The Approach
We show this gap is real by building, to our knowledge, the first distributed agent attack, a multi-agent scaffold that completes hard cybersecurity tasks while hiding the harmful objective across subagents with limited contexts, evading a standard monitor that catches it only a fifth as often as prior agent attacks. Towards a defense, we develop an online stateful monitor that uses real-time clustering to collect weak suspiciousness signals across many agent transcripts, and escalates only rarely to a language model that flags misuse across user accounts.
Key Results
After an extensive red-teaming exercise, we improve the defense and surprisingly also find that it catches standard jailbreaks, since adaptive attackers reuse attack variants across accounts.
Research Areas
This paper contributes to the following areas of AI/ML engineering:
- Machine learning
- Deep learning
- Neural networks
- Model optimization
- AI systems
- Monitoring
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